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CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided twelve cases of
interest dealing with Commercial and Corporate Law. Four of the cases
involve banking, four address corporations or contracts issues, three are
trade regulations cases and the last is a joint venture case.
The four banking cases represent the more important developments in 1991, reflecting the continued deference and broad construction the Tenth Circuit affords banking legislation in the face of
continuing economic difficulties. The remaining eight cases evidence a
more straightforward approach toward the application of existing law.
This Article addresses each of these twelve cases and highlights the judicial restraint and conservative approach exhibited by the court.

II.

BANKING CASES

HistoricalBackground
The savings and loan crisis of the past decade generated much attention, spurring federal regulation designed to strengthen the entire
banking system.1 In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)2 in response
to financial industry failures. This law created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and gave it authority to override state branch banking
laws, which precluded banks obtaining failing or failed thrifts through
emergency acquisitions from operating these thrifts as branches. 3 On
June 1, 1990, pursuant to the provisions of FIRREA, the RTC issued a
regulation known as the "Override Regulation." '4 This regulation enables the RTC to sell a branch of a failed savings and loan to a bank,
which may then operate the facility as its own branch, notwithstanding
5
state prohibitions on branching within the state.
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE UNDER

A.

FIRREA

AND OTHER

ACTS

The Validity of the Override Regulation: State of Colorado v.
6
Resolution Trust Corp.

In 1991 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the
issue of the validity of the Override Regulation. The case was combined
1. Ronald R. Glancz, Thrift Industry Restructured- An Overview of FIRREA, 36 FED. BAR
NEWS &J. 472, 472 (1989).
2. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989).
3. Id at § 501.
4. 12 C.F.R. § 1611.1 (1990).
5. Id.
6. 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991).
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from a New Mexico case in which the federal district court upheld the
regulation, 7 and a Colorado case in which the federal district court determined the regulation to be void and contrary to the provisions of
FIRREA. 8 The Tenth Circuit held that the RTC's interpretation of FIRREA rests on a permissible construction of the statute and that Congress
had properly granted broad rulemaking authority to the RTC.9 Thus,
the court upheld the Override Regulation and ruled that FIRREA can
serve as a source of federal branching authority.' 0 Additionally, the
court held that the RTC regulation violates neither the McFadden Act
nor the Regulatory Flexibility Act. "1
The court first narrowly framed the issue as whether an override of
anti-branch banking law is a valid exercise of the RTC's rulemaking
power under FIRREA.12 Answering affirmatively, the court relied on
Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 13 for the proposition that
where Congress has spoken unambiguously to the power of an agency
courts are required to give effect to that intent.1 4 The court found clear,
unambiguous language indicating that the Emergency Acquisitions provisions of FIRREA provide the RTC authority to issue a regulation overriding state branching laws that preclude nationally chartered banks
from converting acquired failed thrifts into branches.15 Employing a
sweeping standard of deference, the court held that RTC's interpretation that FIRREA authorized its actions was proper, given the background and language of FIRREA and legislative intent giving the RTC
broad authority in implementing FIRREA. The court found especially
persuasive the fact that the statute explicitly applied "notwithstanding
any provision of state law."' 6 Next, the court considered the states' argument that the RTC regulation directly conflicted with the McFadden
Act, which both Colorado and New Mexico contended was the exclusive
source of national bank branch approval.1 7 The court gave great deference to the Comptroller's interpretation of the National Banking Act,
and by doing so, implicitly held that FIRREA exists as an independent
source of federal branching authority.
Although much of the majority opinion is devoted to the statutory
construction of FIRREA and the RTC's authority to override state
branch banking laws, the decision has other significance. One practical
7. Independent Community Bankers Ass'n v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. Civ.- 900532SG, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18584 (D. N.M. June 15, 1990).
8. State of Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 90-Z-190, 1990WL51191, (D.
Colo. Feb. 14, 1991).
9. 926 F.2d at 936-37.
10. Id. at 944-45.
11. Id at 945-48.
12. it at 936.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. 926 F.2d at 936.
15. Id at 936-37.
16. Id at 937 (relying on this language, the court stated that it grants the Resolution
Trust Corporation broad authority to override state law that interferes with enumerated
emergency acquisitions).
17. Id. at 945.
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result of the decision is that it enlarges the class of potential purchasers
of failed thrifts. Pursuant to the RTC regulation, bank holding companies no longer possess exclusive authority to purchase a thrift with facilities in multiple counties because now single unit commercial banks may
also enter the bidding process. This invites hightened competitive bidding, which may result in lower costs to the American public.
Additionally, although the RTC regulation in question only
preempts state laws barring intrastate branching, FIRREA may be interpreted as providing a source of authority for intrastate branching. This
is because the RTC may rely upon this precedent and upon the override
powers to supplant other ,limitations. Also, given the continuing national trend in the banking industry toward consolidation and centralization and the RTC's apparent preference for selling thrifts in their
entirety rather than in a piecemeal fashion to presumably larger banks
or holding companies, these larger institutions may gain a significant
advantage due to the broad lender authority that results from a network
of branches. These suppositions, when compounded with the fact that
many larger institutions are nationally chartered banks, make it clear
that the decision could, in effect, promote the erosion of the competitive
equality doctrine. Finally, despite the fact that many states are gradually

legislatively authorizing branch banking anyway, this precedent of deferential review may be read to extend to other, non-branching-related
state banking laws.
B.

The Standardand Scope of review of Banking Insolvency Decisions:
Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision' 8

Franklin Savings addressed the appropriate scope and standard of
review to be used by a court when a bank challenges the Director of the
Office of Thrift Supervision (Director) in his decision to appoint the
RTC as conservator. The Tenth Circuit held that review is limited to the
administrative record, and that the appointment may be set aside only if
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law. 19 The decision shows that the court gives
great deference to the regulator as an expert decision maker, and that
judicial review of evidence outside of the administrative record will be
20
upheld only in very limited circumstances.
In Franklin Savings, a state-chartered savings and loan association
and its parent company brought suit challenging the Director's decision
to appoint a conservator for the thrift. The Director had determined the
thrift to be unsafe and unsound to transact business due to its aggressive
and financially risky operative strategies. The thrift's management challenged the Director's decision and conclusions.
18. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1992)
(No. 91-1139).
19. Id. at 1142.

20. Id. at 1139-40.
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The district court had conducted a hybrid, de novo review allowing
counsel for the the thrift to cross-examine witnesses, depose expert witnesses and submit other evidence outside of the three-volume administrative record. The district court found that the Director lacked any
factual basis for appointing a conservator and that the appointment was
arbitrary and capricious. The court then ordered the removal of the
21
conservator.
22
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
The court first framed the issue as whether a district court can base its
decision on evidence outside of the administrative record, and what degree of deference is due a Director's decision to appoint a conservator.
After finding no guidance in the organic law, the court found that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) confined the scope of review of a
challenged appointment of a conservator under FIRREA to the information before the Director at the time of the decision. Thus, the administrative record provided the limits of review. 23 After reviewing the
statutory scheme, the legislative history, the APA and the applicable
state law the Tenth Circuit made it clear that the reviewing court should
be particularly deferential when judging an agency's predictive judgment, and that in cases like Franklin Savings, the decisions regarding insolvency remain particularly within the agency's field of discretion and
expertise. 2 4 While the court reaffirmed the arbitrariness, capriciousness, and abuse of discretion standard, it seems to have applied a narrow, seemingly erroneous standard.
Franklin Savings demonstrates that the court will give broad deference to challenged decisions made by regulators of financial institutions
regarding future financial stability. The Tenth Circuit's rather broad interpretation of the APA implicitly presumes that the Director's decision
is correct, thereby making challenges difficult. In view of well-settled
administrative law in this area, the Franklin Savings decision appears defensible. The decision further demonstrates the great deference the
Tenth Circuit gives to regulators in this area. While the trial court apparently viewed its role quite broadly, the appellate court narrowed the
permissible examination, crafting a standard of review that in practice
inhibits successful regulatory challenges.
C.

Decision to Close Bank for Insolvency is Unreviewable in a Pre-closure
25
Proceeding: American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke

In American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke, the Tenth Circuit held that the
Comptroller's decision to close a bank determined to be insolvent is unreviewable in pre-closure proceedings. 2 6 American Bank had been
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 1135-36.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1145-46.
933 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id at 901.
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purchased by a group of investors who were informed, pre-sale, that the
bank required an infusion of $2.4 million to raise its equity capital to the
minimum regulatory level. The investors made this cash infusion and
bought the bank. Yet after examining the financial state of the bank
again and determining that additional losses necessitated further capital
influx, the Comptroller threatened to declare the bank insolvent and
place it into FDIC receivership. After notice of a pending closure, the
bank obtained an injunction on the grounds that the Comptroller
should not be able to make a demand for new capital so soon after a
purchase, and the new owners should be given more time to make the
27
bank profitable.
The district court found the bank's arguments persuasive and temporarily enjoined the Comptroller from closing the bank. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, relying on Adams v.
Nagle,28 a 1938 U. S. Supreme Court decision holding that the Comptroller's decision to close a bank determined to be insolvent is unreviewable in a pre-closure proceeding. 29 The court rejected the bank's
argument that the APA overruled Adams and noted that the APA precludes judicial review of agency action when agencies are given discretionary decision-making powers or when review is precluded by another
statute.3 0 The court concluded there was neither a relevant statutory
grant of discretion nor a preclusion of review in this instance. Nonetheless, after looking at express language in the enabling statute, the statutory scheme, the statutory objectives, the legislative history and the
nature of the administrative action involved, the court found no clear
evidence of legislative intent that pre-closure decisions are unreviewable. 3 1 The court found that the language of the statute authorizing the
Comptroller to appoint a receiver for insolvent banks gave the Comptroller great discretion. Furthermore, the court determined that while a
subsequent revision of the National Bank Act provides for review of
such decisions, the review here was explicitly post-closure. Finally, the
court recognized that judicial intervention preventing or postponing
bank closures would reduce the Comptroller's ability to respond to rapidly changing circumstances of banking activity, thus defeating the purpose of the banking laws.3 2 Once again this case demonstrates the
Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to second-guess regulators' determinations of bank insolvency-an area where regulator expertise is presumed. In doing so, the court broadens the scope of non-reviewability
under the APA.
27. IdL at 900-01.
28. 303 U.S. 532 (1938).
29. 933 F.2d at 901.

30. Id. at 902.
31. Id. at 903-04.
32. Id. at 903.
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Setoff Based on Two Separate and Unrelated Commercial Transactions
During Receivership is Impermissible: Grady Properties Co. v.
33
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

Under the National Bank Act, when a bank is declared insolvent and
it goes into receivership, the debts of the institution are prioritized for
repayment and the general creditors stand in line for repayment with
other creditors.3 4 Often, however, there are several transactions between the institution and its creditors, which, if offset, reduce the
amount of loss suffered by the creditor. Conceivably, such a setoff can
increase the potential liability of the federal insuring agencies.
In Grady Properties, a bank, later declared insolvent, owed fees to a
law firm. The law firm owned land encumbered by mortgage liens held
by the bank. Following the bank's insolvency and reorganization, the
law firm transferred its interest in the encumbered land and assigned its
accounts receivable in the fees owed by the bank to Grady Properties.
Grady Properties notified the bank that it had offset the mortgages on
the land against the debts of the insolvent bank. The reorganized bank,
however, refused to accept Grady's offset. Grady Properties brought a
quiet title action on the properties encumbered by the mortgages, claiming that the mortgages should be canceled due to the refusal of Grady's
attempted setoff. The reorganized bank itself was deemed insolvent and
FSLIC became its receiver. FSLIC removed the action to federal court.
The district court determined that the setoff was based on two separate, unrelated commercial transactions completed without the agreement of the reorganized savings and loan.3 5 The district court stated
that since the reorganized bank had rejected the setoff, Grady Properties
had to stand in line with the bank's other general creditors. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating
that the case of Scott v. Armstrong3 6 provides the correct rule for setoffs
under the National Banking Act. The Scott decision stated that setoff is
not prohibited by the national banking laws when the agreements underlying the setoff demonstrate the contemplation of a mutual transaction.3 7 Furthermore, setoff agreements may be implied from the nature
of the transactions. 3 8 The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the Grady
Properties transactions were separate and unrelated commercial transactions which did not comport with mutuality of obligation as defined in
Scott. 3 9
33. 927 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1991).
34. Kevin J. Foley, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationv. Wood: The FDIC, the Failed
Bank, and the Seemingly Insurmountable Presumption, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 693, 712 (1986).
35. 927 F.2d at 530.
36. 146 U.S. 499 (1892).
37. 927 F.2d at 531.
38. Id

39. Id at 531-32.
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III.

JoINT VENTURES

In the area ofjoint ventures the Tenth Circuit in Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co. 40 returns again to a hands-off approach to the interpretation of
a federal statute. Sullivan dealt with the Federal Employer Liability Act
(FELA), 4 1 which governs the liability of federal employers when they are
sued in tort for injuries to employees. The trend in this area has recently been toward interpretary deregulation. In the face of financial
instability, regulators have merely redefined organizations falling within
their regulatory authority. In this context, FELA has been interpreted to
exclude companies owning railroad track and cars from the definition of
"common carrier" unless they carry the public for hire. 4 2
In Sullivan, Scoular Grain Company and Freeport, a commercial
warehouse lessor, entered into a joint venture to provide commercial
grain storage at a railroad yard. Scoular paid for workers compensation
insurance and ran the daily operations. An employee of the joint venture lost his left arm and leg while unloading grain at the railroad yard.
After collecting $200,000 in worker's compensation benefits, the employee sued the joint venture, the two businesses and the railroad for
negligence under FELA. One of the venturers paid workers compensation premiums and both companies claimed immunity under the state's
worker compensation statute. In addition, both companies asserted that
they were not "common carriers" within the meaning of the term in
FELA. The district court exercized pendant jurisdiction over the state
law claims, granted summary judgment for the joint venture on both
issues and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding either the status of the companies as common carriers, or their im43
munity under the Utah workers compensation statute.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that although
the two companies received grain shipped by railroad companies and
stored grain adjacent to the tracks owned by railroad companies, their
operations were not sufficient to bring them within the statutory definition of common carrier under FELA. 44 Additionally, the court found
that the immunity granted under state law to immediate employers who
pay compensation extends to all members of a joint venture even when
the compensation is paid only by one of the venturers. 45 Framing the
issue as whether every operator who uses the railroad and its operations
falls under FELA's jurisdiction, 4 6 the court adopted the Supreme
Court's analysis in Edwards v. Pacific FruitExpress.4 7 That case held that a
refrigerator car company that owned its own refrigerator cars was not a
930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 57 (1988).
930 F.2d at 800.
Id. at 799.
Id at 800-01.
45. Id at 800-02.
46. Id at 800.
47. 390 U.S. 538 (1968).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

914
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common carrier because it did not carry the public for profit.48 The
Tenth Circuit declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's four-part test to determine common carrier status, 4 9 adopting instead the practice in the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits of using that test as a discretionary
"consideration." 5 0
IV. TRADE

REGULATIONS

During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered three very
different cases in the areas of trademark infringement and unfair competition, price discrimination and the application of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act to a breach of contract claim. In none of these cases
did the court establish new law.
A.

Incontestable Trademark Infringement Requires Showing of Likelihood of
Confusion: Coherent Incorporated v. Coherent Technologies,
51
Incorporated

In Coherent the Tenth Circuit stated that even plaintiffs with incontestable trademarks must show the likelihood of confusion to make a
prima facie case of statutory trademark infringement.5 2 The court reaffirmed the principle that incontestability, while giving the plaintiff the
right to use a trademark, does not, as a matter of law, establish automatic infringement by another user.5 3 While the court affirmed the district court's conclusion, it explicitly set out the appropriate method of
analysis. Coherent involved a California laser manufacturer with incontestable rights to the trademark "Coherent, Inc." The manufacturer
sued a Colorado laser radar systems distributor for federal trademark
infringement and false designation of origin for its use of the word "coherent" in its name and for unfair competition under Colorado common
law. Though both were involved in laser technology, the two firms were
not direct competitors because they operated in different markets, made
different end-products and marketed through different channels. Their
buyers were sophisticated engineers, project managers or corporate officials who bought products built to exact specifications. Following a
54
bench trial, the district court held that no infringement existed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, holding
that a plaintiff with an incontestable trademark must show the likelihood
48. 930 F.2d at 800.
49. Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee, 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1967). In Lone Star,
The Fifth Circuit used the following four elements to determine if the defendant was a
"common carrier" under FELA: First, whether there was actual performance of rail services; second, whether service being performed was contracted by the public; third, whether
the defendant was engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of a contractual relationship
with a railroad; and, fourth, whether defendant received remuneration from a railroad.
50. 930 F.2d at 801.
51. 935 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 1124.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1123-24.
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of confusuion as an element in an infringement case. 5 5 The court found
that interpretation of federal trademark law5 6 requires the giving of
some meaning to the 1988 amendment that states "such conclusive evidence of the right to use the mark shall be subject to proof of infringement. ....-57 The court interpreted this statement as evidence of the
legislative intent to require a plaintiff to prove likelihood of confusion
between two trademarks. 58 The court determined the likelihood of confusion to be a question of fact, and outlined four factors persuasive in
holding that the differences between the two companies outweighed
their similarities. Those factors are: (1) the name "coherent" was
adopted by the Colorado company in good faith; (2) the companies were
not competitors; (3) the companies marketed different products in different markets through different channels; and (4) the buyers of the
companies' products were sophisticated individuals who demanded
items built to exact specifications. 59 Despite survey evidence introduced
by the plaintiff showing likely confusion, the court upheld the district
court's holding of no likelihood of confusion. The court stated that,
contrary to the plaintiff's submission, such surveys must demonstrate
actual market conditions or simulate marketplace decision-making to be
60
valid.
B.

Technical Obsolescence or Introduction of New Products as a Valid
Discrimination:
"Changing Conditions" Defense to Claims of6 Price
1
Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Telephones, Inc.

Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discriminatory
pricing in goods of like quality, which might substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. 6 2 Courts, however, do allow price differentials occasionally where they are "in response to changing conditions
affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as, but not limited to, actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods ... or sales in good faith in
discontinuance of business in the goods concerned." '6 3 Thus, if the
seller can show that it was operating under a variation in the usual market circumstances, that these changes were outside of his or her competitor's control and that the market change resembles one enumerated in
the Act, then the seller's pricing behavior is not actionable under the
"changing conditions" defense. The defense is usually narrow in scope
and limited in application, thereby providing for little judicial analysis.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Ideat 1124.
Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 through 1127 (1988).
935 F.2d at 1125.
Id
Id
It at 1126.
931 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1991).

62. FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT,
328 (1962). See aI/SJULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, 5 ANTITRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATIONS,
§ 32.04 (1969).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
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The Tenth Circuit's treatment of the defense in Comcoa, although somewhat broader than usual, was a typical summary treatment of the law.
There, the court held that technical obsolescence or the introduction of
a new product model satisfies the changing conditions defense when the
facts are at least similar to those established in Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.6
In Comcoa, a defendant phone manufacturer produced two types of
business telephones and offered a volume discount to some of its customers. Plaintiffs were phone equipment distributors who, despite their
requests, were denied the same discounts for similar purchases. The
distributors sued the manufacturer, alleging lost sales, lost assets, permanent business injury as a result of price discrimination, interference
with prospective business relations and a breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted the defendant
summary judgment on the issue of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, but submitted the remaining issues to the jury, which 6ren5
dered a verdict in favor of the defendant on the remaining claims.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict regarding price discrimination and intentional interference with prospective business relations,
but reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendant on
66
the issue of breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the trial court's failure
to submit jury instructions containing the statutory examples of changing conditions was error. Reading Robinson-Patman's explicit language
to extend the changing conditions defense beyond those substantially
similar to those enumerated in the statute, the court found that pricing
modifications due to technical obsolescence and the introduction of a
new product are sufficiently similar to the statute's given excuses to constitute a valid defense. 67 The court concluded that the purpose of the
changing conditions exception to liability under the Robinson-Patman
Act is to facilitate the ready disposition of goods. To find "obsolescence
of some goods" to be a valid changing condition under the Act, the
court took a substance-over-form approach to the legislation, which was
largely enacted to protect small businesses. The court apparently recognized that fluid market conditions would be enhanced if fact finders consider not only conditions affecting sellers of particular goods, but also
temporary and special conditions affecting industry in general.
This slightly more expansive reading of the provision may, as in
Comcoa, deny the ready disposition of goods-exactly opposite of the intent of Congress when passing the law. 6 8 The court's decision, however, is defensible as an implicit recognition that technical
"perishability" is indistinguishable from changing conditions as enu64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

931 F.2d at 661.
Id. at 658-59.
lId at 667.
Id. at 661.
Id at 662 n.8.
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merated in the Act. Such conditions may alter market conditions beyond the seller's control, thereby justifying differential pricing.
C. Applicability of Petroleum Marketing PracticesAct to Termination of
DistributorsAgreement: Metro Oil Co., Inc. v. Sun Refining
69
and Marketing Co.
The case of Metro Oil explores whether a change in credit terms
under a distributors agreement constitutes a termination of the agreement and, thus, bringing it within the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA). 70 The Tenth Circuit held that the changed terms terminated
the franchise agreement in violation of the PMPA, but that the plaintiff's
suit for breach of contract and tortious interference with business rela71
tionships was barred by the PMPA's one-year statute of limitations.
In Metro Oil, a wholesale distributor of motor fuel entered into a
series of distributor agreements with a manufacturer of such fuel. The
agreements provided in pertinent part that the manufacturer could establish the terms under which the distributor would pay for the product
and that the agreements were subject to and governed by the PMPA.
Subsequently, the distributor failed to pay certain invoices or to provide
the requested proof of its ability to pay. The manufacturer changed the
terms and conditions of payment to cash on delivery. From that point,
the distributor alleged that the defendant had wrongfully terminated the
contract, causing distributor to lose dealers. In a letter to the defendant,
the distributor threatened to initiate suit under the PMPA after which
the parties ceased doing business with each other. Two years later the
distributor sued the manufacturer. The district court found the contract
was governed by the PMPA, but that the PMPA's one-year statute of
limitations barred the action. The court also held the plaintiff's claim
for tortious interference was time-barred by Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations for torts. 72 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision, holding that the suit was governed by the PMPA and,
therefore, it was time-barred. The court concluded that summary judgment for defendants was proper because no genuine issue of material
fact existed on the question of the PMPA's applicability and that the district court correctly applied the substantive law. 73 Framing the issue as
whether the action was based upon a termination as contemplated under
the PMPA, the court took a common sense approach that a suit, litigating a defendant's noncompliance with an agreement subject to the
PMPA, required an interpretation that the defendants were actually covered by the statute. The court found that the only remaining issue for
trial was which party terminated the agreement and that in either case
the plaintiff could not prevail. 74 Upon review of the Oklahoma statute,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

936 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1991).
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801 through 2824.
936 F.2d at 504.
Id
Id
Id.
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the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the limita-

tion accrues upon the date of the tortious act or breach, and not upon
the date of the resulting damage. The court ruled this claim was also
time-barred.

75

V.

CORPORATE LAW

In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided four Corporate Law cases.
None of these cases represents a significant departure in the law and are,
thus, only briefly discussed below.
A.

Liability of Successor Corporation Under State Products Liability Laws:
76
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Corp.

In Williams, the court addressed the requirements that must be met
under Oklahoma law before a successor corporation to a defunct predecessor can be held liable for injuries caused by products manufactured
by the predecessor. Williams, the plaintiff, was injured while operating
equipment manufactured by Bowman Hydro-Vat, Inc. Following liquidation of Bowman Hydro-Vat, Jim Bowman, the owner, formed a new
corporation, Bowman Livestock Equipment Corporation. Williams
brought suit against the new company alleging that as a successor corporation, Bowman Livestock was liable for the injuries caused by Bowman
Hydro-Vat's product.
The district court dismissed the action finding no in personamjurisdiction over Bowman Livestock. 77 The Tenth Circuit determined that
Bowman Hydro-Vat's contacts with the forum could be imputed to Bowman Livestock if the forum's law would hold Bowman Livestock liable
for the actions of its alleged predecessor, Bowman Hydro-Vat. The
court then addressed the law regarding successor liability in Oklahoma.
Oklahoma law requires either a defacto merger, a fraudulent transaction
or a new corporation that is a mere continuation of a former corporation
before a court will find that a new company is a successor to a former
one.7 8 In addition, there must be some evidence of an agreement to
assume liabilities and a sale or transfer of all, or substantially all, assets
from a former to a latter corporation must be made. 79 The court determined that in this instance, none of the requirements of Oklahoma law
was met. Since Bowman Livestock was determined not to be a successor
to Bowman Hydro-Vat, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.
B.

Excuse of Duty to Pay After Receipt of Defective Goods: Oral-X Corp. v.
80
Farnam Cos., Inc.
In Oral-X, a manufacturer of horse products, Oral-X, shipped a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id at 1130.
Id. at 1132 n.8.
Id at 1132.
931 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1991).
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small quantity of defective product to its buyer, Farnam. Thereafter,
Farnam canceled its remaining orders. Oral-X sued Farnam for breach
of the marketing agreement, and Farnam sued Oral-X for breach of implied and express warranties. The district court entered judgment for
Oral-X for unpaid production costs and royalties on product received,
but denied Oral-X's request for royalties on Famam's canceled orders.
The Tenth Circuit found that there was no material breach under
Arizona law when Oral-X shipped a small amount of the product that
did not contain an essential ingredient, nor were any warranties
breached by Oral-X. 8 1 Furthermore, the court agreed with the district
court that Oral-X was entitled to royalties from product already shipped,
but stated that the district court erred in refusing to award Oral-X royalties for the orders that were canceled. The court determined that the
not too speculative in this case and
royalties on the canceled orders were
82
that Oral-X was entitled to them.
C.

Non-Occurrence of Condition Precedent and Non-Performance Under a B-B
Company v. PiperJaffray & Hopwood, Inc.83

In B-B Co., B-B, a corporation planning to purchase and develop
resort property, sued Piper Jaffray, a bond underwriter that had promised to underwrite special improvement district bonds for B-B. The district court issued summary judgment in favor of Piper Jaffray. 84 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that creation of a special improvement
district was a condition precedent to PiperJaffray's obligation to underwrite bonds. The court determined that, since Piper Jaffray had promised only to underwrite special improvement district bonds and no other
bonds, failure of the creation of a special improvement district was also a
failure of a condition precedent. Therefore, PiperJaffray was under no
obligation to B-B, and it did not breach its promise. 85
D.

Summary Judgment in a Casefor Specific Performance of a Contract:
86
Deepwater Investments, Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp.

In Deepwater Investments, Deepwater entered into bargaining with
Jackson Hole Ski Corporation to purchase part of a ski resort's operation. After lengthy and involved negotiations, the parties developed an
"interim agreement" and soon disagreements emerged between them.
Eventually, Deepwater sued Jackson Hole Ski Corporation for specific
performance, and upon a motion for summary judgment, the district
court awarded Deepwater summary judgment for specific performance. 87 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, stating that the
81. Id. at 670.
82. Id. at 671.
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existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for Deepwater and that the issue of whether a contract had been
88
entered into was a question of fact for the fact finder to determine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The survey period covered by this Article brought decisions from
the Tenth Circuit that show either great deference to, or broad construction of, various legislation - as with the banking cases - or conformity with established law - as with the remaining cases. The court
exhibited a willingness to yield to the decisions of financial institution
regulators, while applying accepted principles of law in the areas of
trade regulation and corporate law in general.
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